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At least 12 foreign ships are being held hostage in the waters off Eyl in the Nugal region, 300 nautical miles south 
of Africa's Horn, including a Ukrainian vessel, the MV Faina, loaded with 33 tanks and ammunition that was 
hijacked in September.  
The captured ships are being closely watched by hundreds of pirates aboard boats equipped with satellite 
phones and GPS devices. Hundreds more gunmen provide back-up on shore, where they incessantly chew the 
narcotic leaf ‘qat’ and dream of sharing in the huge ransoms that can run into millions of dollars. 
(Source: The Age) 
 
The above article is but one of many in the press in recent times reflecting how 
present day pirates operate. Pirates are still ruling the high seas, but historically 
what triggered their choice of lifestyle and why are they still active in the 21st 
century? Could actions in the past have eradicated the pirate industry a long time 
ago or is it just part of natural evolution? 
Introduction 
Let us begin by going back in time and unravelling the rationale behind the 
formation of pirates on the high seas. The structure aboard a pirate ship was built 
around democracy and the separation of powers; whereas, merchant vessels were 
run in an autocratic manner, with a captain appointed by the owner in charge, 
controlling the ship and crew with all encompassing power. The evolution of piracy 
as an alternative occupation was mainly triggered by abusive work conditions and 
maltreatment aboard merchant vessels, which gave rise to mutiny (Leeson 2007). 
Parallels can be drawn to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model of involuntary unemployment, 
which discusses how the perceived utility from working has to exceed the one of 
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unemployment. Seamen that were maltreated aboard merchant ships perceived a 
low utility in being on the right side of the law subsequently minimising their 
transition cost to piracy. Due to the non-hierarchical nature of pirate ships, the 
crew worked in harmony and unison seeking the most beneficial outcome, as 
opportunistic behaviour was favourable to all. 
  Historically on merchant vessels the interest of the owner and the captain were 
aligned to overcome the principal/agent problem and minimize moral hazard 
issues, by appointing the captains through familial links and giving them shares in 
the vessel they operated to encourage efficient operation whilst at sea (Leeson 
2007). This contractual mechanism worked efficiently with regard to mitigating the 
principal/agent (P/A) problem in the owner and captain relationship. Though the 
P/A problem between owner and captain was mitigated, the P/A problem between 
owner/captain and the remaining crew still existed. In order to address this, 
appropriate incentives need to be offered to all onboard.  
  It is a well established fact in economic theory that when incentives are aligned 
through an effective contract the moral hazard problem can be mitigated between 
the principal and agents. For instance, a simple two-part wage structure, such as a 
base wage plus a bonus enables the owner of the ship to motivate the captain to 
work in his interest. However, only if such a system is extended to all crew members 
are all incentives aboard a given ship aligned.  
  As pirate ships were not acquired legitimately but were stolen, the scope for 
contractual complications arising between the crew and the absent owner was 
minimised (Leeson 2007). Pirate ships appointed a captain who worked as an 
autocrat when pursuing a target or escaping an unsuccessful attack to mitigate 
conflicting debates in tense situations. In all other instances the captain was on 
equal terms with the crew and even slept beside them. Furthermore, the captain 
was democratically elected and could also be removed democratically, which kept 
the intentions of the captain focused on joint utility maximisation. 
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
HYPOTHESIS  
Implied contracts upon 
pirate ships mitigated the 
P/A problem more 
effectively than merchant 
ships. 
MARKET FAILURE 
The P/A problem on 
merchant vessels created a 
negative externality on the 
shipping industry by 
indirectly encouraging 
piracy. 
MARKET SOLUTION               
Apply the conceptual 
agreement of pirate ships 
to merchant vessels. 
  
   
  In seeking to replace the hierarchical structure on a merchant vessel with the one 
found on pirate vessels, the major issue faced is moral hazard, predicated on the 
P/A problem. When the vessel is at sea, the absent owner is unable to measure the 
efforts of the captain and crew (agents), individually or collectively, to ensure his 
interests are being satisfied. This illustrates the classic predicament that results in 
the P/A problem in any contractual relationship where rationally opportunistic 
agents act autonomously, which results in non-pareto optimal behaviour apropos 
the interest of the principal. This situation occurs because the owner is separated 
from the agents and cannot costlessly monitor or measure their performance; for 
instance, by virtue of the crew out at sea their self-interested behaviour, which is at 
odds with the interests of the owner, is exacerbated.  The challenge faced when 
applying the democratic structure of a pirate ship to merchant vessels, is being 
cognizant of the owner’s interest.  
We now look to a model based on Salanie (2005) to stress more methodically, the 
contractual feature between the pirate and merchant ships. To simplify, assume 
that delivering the required outcome is an unknown factor, S denoted for success 
and F for failure, dependant on the agent contributing either a high level of effort 
(eH ) or a low level of effort  (eL  ) The utility function of the agent is denoted  f() = 
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(w) – e which implies that the utility () is a positive function of the wage paid (w) 
and a negative function of the effort expended (e). The probability of success if the 
agent contributes action eH is P and eL is p (or 1 - P).  This can be simplified to give us 
the agent’s incentive constraint: 
P(wS) + (1 – P) (wF) – 1 ≥ p(wS) + (1 – p)(wF)                                (1.1) 
this can be further simplified to 
(P – p)((wS) - (wF)) ≥ 1                                                       (1.2) 
  Effectively, the incentive constraint suggests that the agent will weigh the 
probability of success with the utility gained and the added wage received in 
deciding what level of effort to contribute. When equation (1.2) holds, the agent will 
contribute a high effort and the principal will have to pay the higher wage when the 
agent works. Note that the difference between (wS-wF) will have to increase as P 
diminishes towards p to ensure the agent’s motivation to contribute the high level 
of effort is maintained.  
  The payoff of the principal (the owner), denoted by x can be written as 
f(x) = P(xS – wS) + (1 – P)(xF – wF)                                              (1.3) 
So the principal aims to maximise payoff. The P/A problem is neatly visualised in 
the notion that when the likelihood of success (P) increases, the principal will prefer 
a constant wage of wS = wF = w when the agent would like wS to be even higher. This 
leads to the problem of “hold-up” where the revelation of additional information 
about the probability of success or failure in a venture leads to changes in relative 
bargaining power between the principal and agent. Wage or contract renegotiation 
or even strikes or mutiny are evidence of this sort of effect.  
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This simple framework of a two-part wage framework suggests how incentives can 
be provided to agents such that they work in the interest of the owner without 
having to resort to appointments based on shares and familial connections. The real 
challenge in this application is to formulate and implement a system that allows for 
incentives to encourage a high level of effort transferable through all ranks of crew 
aboard a vessel.  
  As previously discussed, merchant vessels operate under an extremely hierarchical 
structure, giving the mainstream crew no choice but to obey and contribute or be 
punished at the captain’s discretion. Under this structure, much is within the 
captain’s control which can result in disunity amongst the sailors. As previously 
mentioned, the owner can address the moral hazard concerns with the manager by 
offering a two-part wage framework. This system focuses on success or failure, 
though not taking into account whether the captain succeeds at the expense of his 
crew.  Therefore, with regard to applying the more horizontal structure of pirate 
ships successfully to merchant vessels, it is necessary to account for the factor of 
crew satisfaction. Crew satisfaction is an intangible factor and therefore faces 
measurement difficulties, though pirates on the whole do work in unison, whilst it is 
proven that crew upon merchant vessels have historically been somewhat 
oppressed.   
  An alternative remuneration structure that provides an incentive to the entire 
crew to contribute a high effort is needed. This remuneration structure could be an 
incentive based bonus system applicable to all crew onboard the merchant vessel. 
The analysis addresses how a system consisting of a base wage (wb ) with an added 
fixed bonus would work (Dutta 1999). The bonus (B) would be a fixed rate rewarding 
all crew equally, irrespectively of rank, but the agents would only receive the bonus 
when a successful outcome is achieved and would entail a disutility (d) associated 
with the chosen effort, therefore yielding eH takes dH and eL takes dL. The incentive 
constraint of the agent would then become 
DPIBE, December 2008  Pirates as an Ideal  
Abida, et. al.  13
P(wb + B) + (1 – P) (wb) – dH ≥ p(wb + B) + (1 – p)(wb) - dL                      (2.1) 
which can be derived to give us the following condition 
(P  –  p)((wb + B) - (wb)) ≥ dH - dL                                                  (2.2) 
  In other words, this simply means that the probability for receiving the bonus has 
to be higher or equal to the extra disutility it costs the agents to perform the high 
effort. This also means that when the probability for success (P) gets closer to the 
probability for failure (p) when performing the high effort, dH goes toward dL, which 
increases the disutility; and the incentive for performing the high effort moves 
towards zero. A potential problem of having a fixed bonus system across all agents 
is that of a free rider problem where agents do not necessarily contribute at the 
same level of intensity. This would be mitigated by peer pressure and the possibility 
of loss of future employment. 
  The pay-off of the principal (owner) would be altered to 
f(x) = P(xS – wb - B) + (1 – P)(xF – wb)                                               (2.3) 
The owner as a capitalist is interested in profit maximisation. With the wage being a 
base wage estimated for the agent’s level in the hierarchy, the additional cost for 
the principal simply consists of the bonus. For this system to work, the principal 
needs to find it beneficial for the agent to contribute a high level of effort, meaning 
the added pay-off needs to exceed or equal the extra cost of the bonus or   
P(xS ) + (1 – P)( xF )  ≥  P(wb + B) + (1 – P)(xF + wb)                                   (2.4) 
  The bonus achieved is a lesser percentage of the wage for the higher ranks but this 
is justified by fact that the lower ranking crew need to work harder for success to 
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occur than the captain. This system provides the incentive to work because the 
bonus is of higher value to them.  
  Altering the hierarchical structure upon merchant vessels would not be an easy 
task, although the structure upon pirate ships is by far more efficient, effectively 
maximizing the utility of all involved. The prize gained from piracy was divided 
equally among the crew after subtracting awards given for injuries and portions 
drawn by the captain and a few elected men (Salanié 2005). The equality of this 
system can be related to the equality of the division of the bonus in the two-part 
wage framework.  
Conclusion 
As witnessed recently in the press, there has been a resurgence of piracy off the 
coast of Africa, netting pirates large cash ransoms. In this paper we explore the 
application of the contractual structure onboard pirate ships to merchant vessels as 
an exercise in solving the dilemma of an absent owner with no prospect of 
monitoring or measuring the performance onboard the ship when at sea. Since 
agents act autonomously and are opportunistic by nature, a low effort is what a 
crew should be expected to provide when the principal is far removed from the 
agents.  
  By applying a two-part wage framework, such as on a traditional pirate ship, in the 
owner captain contractual relationship the principal/agent problem can be 
minimised. To ensure crew satisfaction on all levels, a wage plus bonus scheme can 
be applied. The base wage can be estimated on the level of rank, and the bonus can 
be a fixed rate rewarding all crew equally. This would increase incentive for lower 
ranked crew to perform at a higher level and the crew would work in unison 
increasing their utility as well as maximise the owner’s returns.  
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  Since pirate ships exist today in spite of their illegality, they perhaps do so in part 
because the contractual relationships they operate by have an evolutionary 
advantage to those used by the merchant ships. If this is true, then their current 
success is a path dependent outcome of practices they adopted several centuries 
ago. If merchant vessels had adopted aspects of the contractual relationships aboard 
pirate ships in the past, it might well have reduced that evolutionary advantage and 
eradicated the pirates of current times.  
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